Britannia Waives the Rules by Grubb, M
During the 1990s, the UK graduallysought to position itself as a leader onclimate change – a tendency that can
be traced to a number of factors. By the year
2001, the dominant consensus in the UK was
that climate change was a serious problem,
that Kyoto was the right way
forward and that the UK could
meet and indeed exceed its
Kyoto target of reducing emis-
sions by 12.5 per cent. It was
believed, moreover, that the
technological innovation asso-
ciated with meeting this target
might well prove beneficial
for the UK economy in the
longer term. 
In this sense, the UK has
moved steadily towards, and
indeed increasingly helped to
define, the European main-
stream on climate change policy. The UK has
worked particularly closely with Germany in
the broader context of European climate
change policy – especially in the recent crisis
surrounding Kyoto which has raised climate
policy to new political heights. The ‘Kyoto cri-
sis’ of 2001 has culminated in the UK emerg-
ing as a leading force within Europe, standing
squarely up to the US position on Kyoto – not
a position the UK is accustomed to. 
The Kyoto crisis 
Until 2001, the EU’s role in cli-
mate change was beset by
paradoxes and contradic-
tions. Throughout the 1990s it
had pretensions to global
leadership and was always
at the forefront of efforts to
strengthen the international
commitments. Yet many crit-
ics questioned whether the
EU’s ambitions were matched
either by political skill or real-
ism internationally, or by the
capacity to implement policy internally.
Arguably the EU’s greatest ‘success’ in rela-
tion to Kyoto – pushing the US to a much
stronger commitment than it would otherwise
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have agreed – has been a principal cause of
many subsequent problems, including ulti-
mately the US’s complete rejection of the
agreement. Progress on internal policy has
also been relatively slow and faltering, lag-
ging far behind the rhetoric.
The Europeans were initially sceptical
about the US proposals at Kyoto for interna-
tional ﬂexibility. The UK was the closest to the
US position, and was happy with the ﬁnal out-
come at Kyoto. Some European countries
remained resistant to interpreting Kyoto’s
ﬂexibilities to the degree the US wanted in the
subsequent negotiations. These talks culmi-
nated at the Hague, where the EU’s internal
strife and reluctance to yield on these issues
were at the root of that conference’s collapse,
captured for the popular imagination by John
Prescott storming out, muttering darkly about
the French EU presidency and subsequently
being accused of arrogance and machismo. 
The collapse of The Hague negotiations in
late 2000 was a huge shock to European pol-
icymakers. From any logical standpoint, it
made no sense to allow the negotiations to col-
lapse over a relatively small difference over
carbon sinks, when there was a good prospect
that the deal was more favourable than any
likely to be struck under a successor US
administration. It exposed the fundamental
problems of EU policymaking in the inter-
national negotiations. The green rhetoric of
refusing to compromise ‘environmental
integrity’ suddenly looked hollow and irre-
sponsible when faced with the alternative
prospect of achieving nothing at all. 
Just as the EU was regrouping and digest-
ing the lessons from The Hague, President
Bush announced his opposition to the Proto-
col. The way in which this was handled, with
no consultation and an arrogance that
shocked (Condeleeza Rice announced to a
startled meeting of EU diplomats in Wash-
ington that ‘Kyoto is dead’), was seen as a
direct assault on the integrity of the EU and
indeed the international system. It was clear
that the EU was the only actor powerful
enough to save the Kyoto Protocol. Most
doubted that it could – or whether it really
wanted to – and so the Kyoto crisis became
a test of the EU itself. 
Between The Hague in late 2000 and the
next round of talks in Bonn in July 2001, the
EU underwent a remarkable political trans-
formation. The Troika structure was changed
to include the European Commission for
greater continuity in the lead negotiating
team. Perhaps more remarkable was the
change in the whole approach, largely at the
instigation of the Swedish Presidency. Previ-
ously, the EU had expended most of its ener-
gy on internal negotiations, often on points
of detail and symbolic ﬁghts that were of lit-
tle relevance to the broad outcome of nego-
tiations. Given its limited resources, this left
little time for building relationships with
other countries. In the aftermath of the Bush
announcement, the Swedish Presidency con-
vened close but quick consultations amongst
the leading governments, working closely
also with the Belgian government that was to
inherit the Presidency for Bonn. Within a
couple of weeks, the EU had dispatched a
high-level mission to other key capitals
including Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and
Tokyo. They returned with a united convic-
tion that there was a chance to save the Kyoto
Protocol, and focused intently upon that. 
At the Goteberg summit in June 2001 the
EU extracted a public promise from President
Bush that, should the rest of the world choose
to go ahead, the US would not interfere. The
Japanese remained hopeful up to the last
moment that the President would change his
mind, to save Japan from the dilemma of hav-
ing to choose between Kyoto and the US. The
world continued to be obsessed with the US
position right up until Bonn itself. 
When it arrived it was faced with the task
of trying to negotiate an agreement that some
countries felt no longer made sense without
US participation – while at the same time
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knowing that the US was unlikely to proffer
an alternative. The EU – working closely
with the G77 group of developing countries
headed by a highly-focused Iranian delega-
tion – drove the negotiating process forward
at a ferocious pace, seeking all avenues to pos-
sible compromise, but refusing to sacriﬁce the
fundamental principle that the Kyoto targets
had to be legally-binding. The result was the
Bonn agreement. The EU maintained its
integrity and commitment through to the
Marrakesh Conference of Parties, where again
it was pivotal in orchestrating the negotiations
to a point of ﬁnal agreement on the legal texts
required for ratiﬁcation. 
The fact that the EU rose to the challenge
has changed the political
landscape – and also proved
a watershed for the UK’s role
in European climate change
affairs. 
The UK in Europe
Traditionally, as in many other
policy areas, the UK used to
be somewhat adrift from the
European mainstream on cli-
mate change policy and clos-
er to the US. In negotiating the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the UK brokered the unwieldy
compromise in Article 4.2, between the Euro-
pean desire for hard targets and the US refusal
to have any mention of targets. In Kyoto, with
the UK in practice leading the Troika, the UK
was pivotal in gaining EU acquiescence for
US-led ideas on key ﬂexibilities in the treaty,
not least emissions trading. At The Hague, the
UK – this time without any mandate – tried
to rescue the package in small talks with the
US. 
A substantial instinct in the UK, following
President Bush’s rejection, was to seek
grounds for compromise with the US. The
British efforts to persuade the US back into
Kyoto fell on stony ground, however. Some
traditionalist voices then argued that a Treaty
without the US would be unworkable and
pointless; and indeed that the UK should
seek to maintain its ‘special relationship’ by
indulging the US and exploring alternatives. 
However, the Prime Minister had, only a
few weeks before President Bush’s announce-
ment, made a strong speech in favour of
stronger action on climate change in gener-
al, and support for Kyoto in particular, and
he was also wary of the usual criticism of UK
premiers as poodles of the US. The lack of any
serious alternative proposed structure for an
agreement left little room for fudging the
issue. As one ofﬁcial later remarked, there was
indeed an ‘outbreak of poodle-ism in some
parts of the UK Foreign Ofﬁce
– but it was quickly
squashed’. The UK stood ﬁrm
on the principle that Kyoto
was the right way forward. In
public, Tony Blair sought to
deﬂect public fury about the
US position with conciliatory
noises; in private, he told
President Bush ﬁrmly that cli-
mate change was serious and
Kyoto was the right approach,
as well as the politically-legitimate approach
based upon long global negotiations; and
that the UK and most other European coun-
tries fully intended to stick with it. 
The transformation of the EU between
The Hague and Bonn thus also helped to
cement the UK in Europe. In Bonn there were
no freelance initiatives, and there was no
griping at ceding the leading role to and act-
ing in concert with the Belgian presidency.
The UK was ﬁrmly ‘one of the team’, and an
effective member. 
UK domestic developments
Inevitably, European collaboration is both
more directly relevant, and comes easier, on
the international stage than for domestic pol-
icy. The UK has – in common with many other
“Traditionally, as in
many other policy
areas, the UK used to
be somewhat adrift
from the European
mainstream on
climate change
policy and closer to
the US”
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European countries – tended to develop its
own distinctive set of domestic policies to
tackle greenhouse gas emissions. UK elec-
tricity liberalisation, pursued of course for
entirely other reasons, had the happy conse-
quence of leading to large reductions in emis-
sions as coal generation was replaced by
natural gas; it is estimated that about half the
total reductions since 1990 could be attributed
to this. Some enterprising ofﬁcials also seized
the opportunity of electricity liberalisation,
and a shambolic debate about protecting
nuclear power in the liberalised system, to
introduce the ‘non-fossil fuel obligation’
(NFFO) that resulted in market-based support
primarily for renewable energy. Another by-
product of the liberalisation process was the
Energy Savings Trust, funded primarily by the
regional electricity supply companies and
focused upon promoting energy efﬁciency in
the domestic and transport sectors. 
As renewable energy grew during the
1990s, and the NFFO expired, the government
established a target to achieve 10 per cent of
UK electricity supplies from renewables by
2010, and moved to a new system of trade-
able renewable energy credit supports to
achieve this. It also began to put more sub-
stantial money towards supporting demon-
stration of renewable energy technologies. In
April 2002, the government established the
UK Carbon Trust, charged by the Prime Min-
ister with fostering transition in the business
sector towards a low carbon economy. 
By far the most controversial element of
UK implementation – indeed, probably the
most controversial policy issue for business
in the whole of the Labour Party’s ﬁrst term
– was the ‘climate levy’, a tax levied upon
industrial energy use. Strong lobbying failed
to dislodge the tax, but it did succeed in gain-
ing various derogations (of 80 per cent) for
energy-intensive industries in return for
negotiated energy efﬁciency target improve-
ments. From this experience, in turn, were
born business-led proposals for a quasi-emis-
sions trading scheme, in which the govern-
ment gives financial inducements for
companies to opt in to a cap-and-trade sys-
tem, that excludes power production. 
This last area is the one which perhaps gives
the most scope to inject a new division
between UK and continental Europe. The UK
system, which comes into operation in early
2002, is clearly at odds with the European pro-
posals for a mandatory cap-and-trade system
including power generation that were ﬁnally
presented as a speciﬁc proposed Directive –
a turning point also in the credibility of EU in
terms of implementation – in 2001. In the
eyes of many, the UK system would not be
adequate to address emissions in the longer
term and should only be considered as a tran-
sitional system; but it already has its ﬁerce
defenders. The new-found cosy relationship
between the UK and the rest of European cli-
mate policy could yet come unstuck as Europe
moves towards implementation. 
Overall however, for the ﬁrst time since
negotiations began in 1991, EU leadership on
climate change has an international legitimacy
that it previously lacked – and with the UK
integrated more than ever before. The EU has
acquired a stark global responsibility and cli-
mate change could even be seen as an issue
of European identity and credibility. The
inevitable challenges of implementation will
be set within that reality 
